The
national debate on Supreme Court nominations is dominated by a
larger debate over the most controversial social issues of our
time. More specifically, the debate is dominated by a disagreement
as to who has the final word on these issues. Who should decide
whether abortion or gay marriage is legal in the United States?
Congress or the courts?
Generally
speaking, strict constructionists say that congress or a state
legislature should decide. The judicial philosophy of strict
constructionism advocates for judicial restraint. Judges should
strictly construe and apply the law as it stands. And the
Constitution says nothing about gay marriage.
The average
legal Darwinist, however, would give the courts the authority to
decide. Legal Darwinism stands for the proposition that our
Constitution evolves through the judiciary's interpretation of an
ever-changing public sense of justice.
In a recent
op-ed published by USAToday, Duke Law professors Erwin
Chemerinksy and Catherine Fisk call for a more accurate framing of
the debate over the nomination of Judge John Roberts and the role
of the Supreme Court. The thesis of their piece is best introduced
by its title, "Judges do make law -- it's their
job."
Chemerinsky
and Fisk assert that "every lawyer knows that judges make
law," and thus, the conservative outcry against "legislat[ing]
from the bench" consists of "[m]isleading and silly
slogans." According to them, we can argue about what kind of
law Judge Roberts should make, but the role of judges as lawmakers
is not up for debate. To back up this proposition, Chemerinksy and
Fisk cite to the law of torts (examples of torts include assault,
battery, defamation, and negligence), property, and contracts.
Granted, all three of these areas of the law have a substantial
judge-made component.
Few,
however, are concerned with Judge Roberts' take on torts law. Why?
First off, torts are generally handled by state judges. And since
the judiciary's heavy involvement in the creation of torts law
precedes the Constitution, most conservatives don't see its
continued involvement as something new or radical. Moreover, if a
state legislature disagrees with their courts' formulation of a
particular tort, they can generally override the judge-made law by
statute.
As
Chemerinsky is well aware, strict constructionists are primarily
concerned with constitutional law. Since the Constitution is the
supreme law of the land, no legislature can override its
provisions by statute. If the Supreme Court is allowed to simply
"make" constitutional law, there is no legislative check
on this power.
Chemerinksy
and Fisk argue that "Supreme Court justices must interpret
the broadly worded provisions of the Constitution and decide the
meaning of vague terms that protect 'liberty' or prevent
government from the 'establishment of religion' or from imposing
'cruel and unusual punishment.'" The professors are
absolutely right. The Constitution must be interpreted in order to
be applied.
There is a
genuine debate, however, between strict constructionists and legal
Darwinists as to what a judicial interpretation should involve.
Strict constructionists look to the words of the Constitution informed
by history and the Founding Fathers' intent to determine its
plain meaning. Legal Darwinists attempt to use contemporary ideas
of justice to create new law. That's a big difference.
Despite
arguments to the contrary, there is a legitimate need for the
American public to debate this difference. The phrase,
"legislate from the bench," is more than a mere
"slogan," it represents a legitimate concern. Remember
the separation of powers and the dangers of tyranny? Anyone?
In the sense
that interpretations differ, or that state courts continue to
oversee the common law in the absence of statutory authority,
Chemerinsky and Fisk are right: Judges do make law. The careful
reader will note, however, that their argument breaks down if
extended to constitutional law.
Not all
lawyers agree that judges and justices of the federal courts
should rewrite the Constitution on whim. And true conservatives
are not okay with "rock star" activist judges who happen
to rule in their favor.
Undeniably,
there are judges who "make" constitutional law. Michael
Newdow passed the 9th Circuit, didn't he? But I am not being
disingenuous when I say that legislating from the bench is wrong.
Legal Darwinists
and strict
constructionists are locked in an ongoing debate. We can
disagree as to which judicial philosophy is best for America. But
we must recognize that protests against judicial activism and
legislating from the bench are more than slogans or
campaign-speak.
Some judges
do make constitutional law. But in the opinion of strict
constructionists, it's not their job.
Copyright ©
2005 by John T. Plecnik.
John T. Plecnik (JTP) is a 21-year-old law student at Duke University, where he
serves as Senior Note Editor of the Duke Journal of Constitutional Law & Public
Policy. Homeschooled from cradle to college, John graduated from Belmont Abbey at
the age of 19. He finished summa cum laude, sharing the title of Valedictorian.
Author's
website.
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